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Investor litigation is an increasingly vexatious field of law.  Nearly
every time a significant change of control or corporate ownership occurs,
plaintiffs’ attorneys file standardized complaints to set in motion class
action suits.1  Ultimately, the settlements shareholders receive fail to
achieve the practical effects that parties on both sides desire.
Shareholders may receive pennies on the dollar of what they allege was
lost by corporate wrongdoing, and, in some cases, shareholders may not
receive monetary recovery as the settlement requires only that the
corporation to make changes to its governing documents.2  These suits
distract directors and management from the core operational aspects of
their business.3 Corporations will pay enormous fees to attorneys and
experts to defend against the suits.4  Often times, as a result of director
and officer liability insurance, neither corporations nor directors pay
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1. See Natalia Steele, Mergers & Acquisitions Strike Suits: What’s a Bank To Do?,
SAFE TALK (Am. Bankers Ass’n Ins. Servs.), Sept. 2014, at 1, 1–2, available at http://abais
.com/Data/Sites/1/downloads/SafeTalk2014/SafeTalk.September2014-Merger_and_Acquisi
tion_Strike_Suits-NS.pdf.
2. See Paul D. Weitzel, The End of Shareholder Litigation? Allowing Shareholders to
Customize Enforcement Through Arbitration Provisions in Charters and Bylaws, 2013 BYU
L. REV. 65, 67, 73 (2013).
3. See ANDREW J. PINCUS, WHAT’S WRONG WITH SECURITIES CLASS ACTION
LAWSUITS? 7 (2014), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/Secur
ities_Class_Actions_Final1.pdf.
4. See id. at 6, 9.
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damages out of pocket, making it unlikely that the suits serve a deterrent
function, one of the principal policy goals behind allowing for such suits.5
Consequently, corporations have increasingly turned to arbitration as a
way to settle corporate disputes, including those with shareholders.  “An
agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a specialized
kind of forum-selection clause that posits not only the situs of suit but also
the procedure to be used in resolving the dispute.”6  Several scholars have
addressed the merits of arbitration as it pertains to corporate strategy or
judicial economy.  This Note instead will focus on the statutory provisions,
judicial decisions, and external factors that impact the implementation and
legality of arbitration provisions in a shareholder litigation context.  In
doing so, this Note will seek to answer (1) whether a corporation may
adopt an arbitration provision that binds investors—who are often
shareholders—and the corporation to mandatory individual arbitration,
and if so, (2) what language or types of features a permissible provision
would contain.
This Note will proceed in five parts.  Part I presents a definition of an
arbitration provision to guide this discussion.  Part II addresses the
statutory basis for implementing arbitration clauses under the Delaware
General Corporation Law (DGCL)7 and discusses which actors have the
authority to adopt arbitration clauses, concluding that incorporators,
directors, or shareholders may implement arbitration clauses by including
them in the articles of incorporation or the bylaws.  Part III discusses the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)8 and related US Supreme Court cases,
which present additional federal tests for assessing the validity of
arbitration clauses.  Part IV analyzes state law contract considerations,
focusing on mutual assent and unconscionability.  Part V presents the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission’s (the “Commission”)
role in regulating arbitration clauses.  While the Commission can pressure
corporations in order to prevent inclusion of arbitration clauses in such
offerings, it has refrained from issuing formal decisions against arbitration
clauses.  Part VI concludes by addressing key practical consequences of
the current state of affairs and raising questions for corporations and
courts to consider in the future.
PART I: POSSIBLE FORMS OF ARBITRATION PROVISIONS
Arbitration clauses, like other contractual terms, can be written to
meet the parties’ specific needs.  For example, a corporation could draft a
provision so that it only applied to certain disputes above or below a given
5. See Weitzel, supra note 2, at 73–75.
6. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974).
7. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, ch. 1 (2014).
8. Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified at 9
U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2014)).
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monetary threshold, as some corporations have done.9  Additionally, arbi-
tration provisions may be written to require individual arbitration, thereby
preventing class resolution.  For the purposes of this Note, discussion of
arbitration provisions will refer to mandatory binding arbitration on an
individual basis, without regard to a monetary threshold.  This definition is
appropriate because corporations are most likely to propose clauses in this
manner and because a focus on individual suits allows for a more clear
illustration of the dichotomy between the current class-action centered re-
gime, thus providing an opportunity for a more fruitful legal discussion of
baseline state law requirements.
PART II: IMPLEMENTATION OF ARBITRATION PROVISIONS
A corporation could implement mandatory arbitration provisions in a
variety of ways.  Because corporate law is a state matter, the methods
available to enact arbitration provisions may vary state-by-state, but this
Note will focus on Delaware law.  Legal support for various methods of
implementation within Delaware come from statues, principally the
DGCL, and judicial opinions interpreting the same.
Arbitration provisions may be implemented in one of three ways.
They can be: (1) written into the corporation’s articles of incorporation;
(2) included in the corporation’s bylaws, either as an initial bylaw or added
as a subsequent amendment; or (3) negotiated between the corporation
and shareholders on an individual basis.  The third method, individual con-
tracting, is least appealing because it would entail prohibitively high trans-
action costs.  Attorneys would have to contact and negotiate with each
shareholder to ensure all shareholder disputes were arbitrated, thus de-
feating a primary purpose of arbitration.
DGCL Section 102(b)(1) authorizes the first method, inclusion in the
articles of incorporation.  The code states that the “certificate of incorpo-
ration may also contain any or all of the following matters: (1) Any provi-
sion for the management of the business and for the conduct of the affairs
of the corporation, and any provision creating, defining, limiting and regu-
lating the powers of the corporation, the directors, and the stockholders,
or any class of the stockholders.”10  Broadly speaking, an arbitration pro-
vision, if mandatory, requires the shareholder to forego bringing any
claims in a legal proceeding.  By requiring shareholders to forego a right,
the arbitration provision “limit[s] . . .  the powers . . . of the stockholders,”
and is within the broad scope of Section 102(b).
DGCL Sections 109(a) and (b) set forth the second way by which arbi-
tration provisions could be adopted —corporation bylaws.  Section 109(b)
delimits the permissible scope of bylaws, stating “[t]he bylaws may contain
9. Letter from Kevin L. Vold, Partner, Hogan Lovells, on behalf of Gannett Co., Inc.,
to Office of Chief Counsel, Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, at 20 (Dec. 27,
2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2012/2donaldvuche
tich022212-14a8.pdf [hereinafter Vold].
10. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (2010) (section label omitted).
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any provision, not inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorpo-
ration, relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its af-
fairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders,
directors, officers or employees.”  As with the articles of incorporation,
this definitional section casts a wide net under which arbitration would
fall.  Significantly, arbitration relates to “the rights or powers of its stock-
holders.”  Moreover, insofar as claims were brought derivatively, such as
claims against an inside director, the arbitration provision would relate to
the rights or powers of directors.  Consequently, an arbitration clause
would be appropriate in the bylaws.
With an understanding of how arbitration clauses could be imple-
mented, one must next ascertain who could place the arbitration clause in
the articles of incorporation or the bylaws.  The original incorporators
have the ability to draft the articles of incorporation.  Alternatively, if a
corporation is to include the arbitration clause in its bylaws, when the pro-
vision is adopted affects who has the ability to implement the term.  Sec-
tion 109(a) provides that “[t]he original or other bylaws of a corporation
may be adopted, amended or repealed by the incorporators, by the initial
directors of a corporation . . .  or, before a corporation . . .  has received
any payment for any of its stock, by its board of directors.”11  If, however,
the corporation has sold stock, Section 109(a) stipulates, “the power to
adopt, amend or repeal bylaws shall be in the stockholders entitled to
vote.”12  Nevertheless, regardless of when the provision is proposed, the
corporation has the ability to, “in its certificate of incorporation, confer
the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon the directors.”13  Just
because an election under Section 109(a) to empower boards to amend the
bylaws has been implemented does not preclude shareholders from retain-
ing their rights to modify the bylaws.14  Thus, in practice, three groups may
implement an arbitration provision on behalf of the corporation: the origi-
nal incorporators, the board of directors, and the stockholders, with the
latter two being the most likely actors.
One commentator believes that shareholder proxy votes might not be
appropriate for adopting arbitration provisions that bind all shareholders
because the power of a majority of shareholders to alter the bylaws is not
absolute.15  On the contrary, Delaware courts have favorably addressed
efforts to include procedures analogous to arbitration in corporate bylaws,
thus affirming the ability of the original incorporators, the board of direc-
tors, and the stockholders to implement provisions not inconsistent with
11. Id. § 109(a).
12. Id.
13. Id. See also Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 492 (Del. Ch. 1995).
14. Tit. 8, § 109(a) (“The fact that such power has been so conferred upon the direc-
tors or governing body . . . shall not divest the stockholders or members of the power, nor
limit their power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws.”).
15. See generally Barbara Black, Arbitration of Investors’ Claims Against Issuers: An
Idea Whose Time has Come?, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 110 (2012).
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the scope of Sections 102 and 109.  For example, the Delaware Chancery
Court upheld inclusion of a forum selection clause, stating, “if boards of
directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum would provide
an efficient and value-promoting locus for dispute resolution, then corpo-
rations are free to respond with charter provisions selecting an exclusive
forum for intra-entity disputes.”16 Galaviz v. Berg also suggests that a
charter amendment adopted by a majority of shareholders would be en-
forceable, meaning that shareholders can bind each other to terms when
properly put to a vote.17  In Berg, a federal court addresses arguments
about the effect of a venue provision for derivative actions in a corpora-
tion’s articles of incorporation, stating “were a majority of shareholders to
approve such a charter amendment, the arguments for treating the venue
provision like those in commercial contracts would be much stronger, even
in the case of a plaintiff shareholder who had personally voted against the
amendment.”18
Even so, experts have suggested that Delaware courts may be hesitant
to relinquish control over corporate lawsuits because the courts have de-
veloped a nuanced and well-developed corporate law regime.19  Despite
these concerns, Title 10 Chapter 3 of the Delaware Code sets forth general
approval of arbitration as a dispute resolution procedure.  In particular,
Section 349, titled “Arbitration Proceedings for Business Disputes” pro-
vides that “[t]he Court of Chancery shall have the power to arbitrate busi-
ness disputes when the parties request a member of the Court of
Chancery, or such other person as may be authorized under rules of the
Court, to arbitrate a dispute.”20  Two other provisions suggest that resolu-
tion of all corporate questions by Delaware courts is not mandatory.  First,
Section 102(b)(2) allows a corporation to include a term that states:
Whenever a compromise or arrangement is proposed between this corpora-
tion and its creditors or any class of them and/or between this corporation and
its stockholders . . . , any court . . . may, on the application in a summary way
of this corporation or of any creditor or stockholder thereof . . . order a meet-
ing of the creditors or class of creditors, and/or of the stockholders or class of
stockholders of this corporation, . . . in such manner as the said court directs.21
Because Section 102(b)(2) is optional in that a corporation may, not
must, include the term, it is possible to conclude that Delaware allows for
disputes between the corporation and its stockholders to avoid resolution
of a procedure that the court directs.  Section 102(b)(7) addresses this is-
sue directly, allowing a corporation to include “[a] provision eliminating or
limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stock-
holders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a direc-
16. In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010).
17. Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
18. Id. at 1175.
19. See, e.g., Weitzel, supra note 2, at 93.
20. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349(a) (2014).
21. Tit. 8, § 102(b)(2)(i).
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tor.”22  If a corporation could exempt itself from certain conduct, thereby
preventing it from being haled into court, the corporation should similarly
be able to modify its liability using procedural devices, such as arbitration.
Together DGCL Sections 102(b)(2) and 102(b)(7) and Section 349 of Title
10 illustrate the permissive scope of the DGCL and indicate that a corpo-
ration incorporated in the state could use its articles of incorporation or
bylaws to implement mandatory arbitration of shareholder-corporation
disputes.
PART III: FEDERAL AUTHORITY
The FAA, codified in Title 9 of the United States Code, specifies the
requisite components of an arbitration agreement and the procedural pro-
cess by which courts will direct parties to arbitration.23  Section 2 of the
FAA concerns matters of validity, irrevocability, and enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate.24  It provides that a written provision in any con-
tract evidencing a transaction involving “commerce” to arbitrate a contro-
versy “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”25  This is
the principal statutory proclamation that illustrates Congressional intent
to permit arbitration agreements.  Section 1 of the FAA gives Section 2
expansive scope by defining “commerce,” as the traditional articulation of
interstate commerce.  Impliedly, via statutory interpretation maxim expres-
sio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 1 excludes from its scope contracts
entered into between parties on a strictly intrastate basis.26  Section 1 also
excludes “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”27  Of
significance, Section 1 does not exclude shareholder-corporation agree-
ments from its scope.28  Because securities laws have indicated a broad
view as to what constitutes interstate activity, it is likely that the majority
of arbitration agreements will be subject to the FAA.  Finally, Section 3
provides the procedure through which Section 2 may be implemented, re-
quiring US courts to stay any matter subject to arbitration that is submit-
ted to the court.29
Following its passage, the Supreme Court enshrined applicability of the
FAA by declaring arbitration to be the equivalent of litigation, stating,
“contractually required arbitration of claims satisfies the statutory pre-
22. Id. at § 102(b)(7).
23. See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2014).
24. Id. § 2.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Bradley v. Brentwood Homes, Inc., 730 S.E.2d 312 (S.C. 2012) (applying
the distinction between interstate and intrastate commerce).
27. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2014).
28. Id.
29. Id. § 3.
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scription of civil liability in court.”30  To defend the FAA, federal courts
have been concerned with three primary tasks: (1) ensuring that arbitra-
tion agreements are not undermined by substantive state law; (2) ensuring
that the FAA is not undermined by substantive regulations of other fed-
eral laws; and (3) validating arbitration agreements against federal com-
mon law venue rules.
First, courts enforce the FAA against state law intrusions.31  Parties are
given contractual latitude with respect to the procedural way in which
claims are brought so long as the substantive goals of the underlying stat-
utes are not undermined.  The Supreme Court first articulated this logic in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., where the Court
stated, “so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to
serve both its remedial and deterrent function.”32
The line between procedure and substance was not always obvious,
leading to several preemption cases.  In Southland Corp. v. Keating, the
Court addressed whether a California franchising law voiding any clause in
an agreement that required franchisees to waive their rights under that law
was able to allow a party to escape enforcement of an arbitration clause.33
Holding that it was not, the Supreme Court stated that “the ‘involving
commerce’ requirement in § 2” is “a necessary qualification on a statute
intended to apply in state and federal courts.”34  Consequently, the Court
construed Congressional intent “to foreclose state legislative attempts to
undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.”35  The Court rein-
forced this holding in the recent case of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concep-
cion, holding that “[s]tates cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent
with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.”36  The Con-
cepcion plaintiffs sought to avoid an arbitration clause by relying on the
Ninth Circuit’s Discover Bank rule, which provided that class-action waiv-
ers in consumer contracts of adhesion were unconscionable under certain
circumstances. Concepcion preempted the Discover Bank rule because it
“[stood] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.”37
States also may not give parties different rights or apply different legal
standards to arbitration agreements than they would otherwise apply to
30. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S.Ct. 665, 671 (2012).
31. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1746, 1753 (2011)
(holding that the FAA preempts California’s rule classifying most collective-arbitration waiv-
ers in consumer contracts as unconscionable).
32. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637
(1985).
33. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
34. Id. at 14–15.
35. Id. at 16.
36. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
37. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
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contract law cases.  In the words of the Supreme Court, “courts must place
arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts.”38  As is
the purpose of enforcing contracts in general, “the FAA’s central purpose
is to ensure that ‘private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to
their terms.’”39  Justice Scalia issued the Concepcion opinion over the dis-
sent’s argument that class proceedings had independent value because
they are “necessary to prosecute small-dollar claims that might otherwise
slip through the legal system.”40  Instead, the decision stressed the intent
of the parties, stating “class arbitration, to the extent it is manufactured . . .
rather than consensual, is inconsistent with the FAA.”41  Such logic built
upon prior Supreme Court decisions in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v.
Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University and First Options
of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan.42  As these cases illustrate, the policies read
into FAA seek to prevent the parties from being surprised and from being
forced to address their claims in unanticipated manners.43
Second, courts seek to ensure that other federal laws do not interfere
with the enforcement of the FAA.  “Arbitration provisions are presumed
to be valid unless ‘the party opposing arbitration carries the burden of
showing that Congress intended in a separate statute to preclude a waiver
of judicial remedies, or that such a waiver of judicial remedies inherently
conflicts with underlying purposes of that other statute.’”44  General anti-
waiver provisions (which some contend includes Section 29(a) of the Ex-
change Act) are not barriers to the enforcement of arbitration provisions
pursuant to the FAA.45  Moreover, if a statute providing a substantive
right is silent on whether claims can proceed in an arbitrable forum, the
FAA requires the arbitration agreement to be enforced according to its
terms.46
38. Id. at 1742.
39. Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 664 (2010) (quoting
Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)).
40. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1753.
41. Id. at 1751.
42. Volt Info. Scis. 489 U.S. at 479 (discussing arbitration as “a matter of consent”);
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (describing arbitration “is a
way to resolve those disputes—but only those disputes—that the parties have agreed to sub-
mit to arbitration.”).
43. Cf. Century Indem. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 584 F.3d 513,
531–32. (3d Cir. 2009) (recognizing that it could not require arbitration agreements to be
“express” and “unequivocal” as a predicate of being enforced because to do so would “im-
permissibly . . . require more of arbitration agreements than of contracts generally to be
enforced whenever the standard differed from the applicable state-law principles of contract
law.”).
44. Letter from Cyril Moscow, Professor, Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., to Office of Chief
Counsel, Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Jan. 12, 2012) (on file with the U.S.
Securities & Exchange Commission) (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Ex-
press, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483 (1989)) (in response to Gannett No Action Letter Request).
45. See CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S.Ct. 665 (2012).
46. Id. at 673.
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Third, federal courts assess the validity of arbitration agreements in the
context of traditional venue rules. Because arbitration clauses are deriva-
tive of traditional forum selection clauses, venue laws subsume them and,
as one court stated, “[T]he enforceability of a purported venue require-
ment is a matter of federal common law.”47  Under the leading case in this
area, M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., a venue provision in a “freely
negotiated” contract should not be set aside “unless Zapata could clearly
show that that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the
clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching.”48  Building
on the Zapata decision, in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute the Court
upheld a forum-selection clause contained on the back of a cruise ticket.49
In Carnival Cruise, the Court rejected the argument that the passenger’s
lack of opportunity or bargaining power to negotiate the contract terms
rendered enforcement of the venue clause unreasonable.50
Relying on these decisions, the District Court for the Northern District
of California addressed the validity of an arbitration clause unilaterally
adopted by a corporation’s directors in Berg.  The terms of the underlying
agreement in this case skewed in favor of the corporation vis-à-vis share-
holders: the individual corporate directors who would eventually be
named as defendants unilaterally adopted the bylaw after the alleged
wrongdoing took place. Berg distinguished its facts from those contained
in the prior decisions of Zapata and Carnival Cruise, noting that in both of
those cases “the provision was present in the original agreement” entered
into by both parties.51  Consequently, the District Court deemed an agree-
ment adopted under these circumstances invalid because “there is no ele-
ment of mutual consent to the forum choice at all, at least with respect to
shareholders who purchased their shares prior to the time the bylaw was
adopted.”52  When the Berg court issued its decision, it acknowledged that
the matter was one of first impression.
Presently, other Circuits have neither endorsed nor disputed the Berg
holding.  Further, Berg presented only one of several possible fact pat-
terns; for example, a corporation could have adopted the provision after
investors purchased shares but before alleged corporate wrongdoing oc-
curred.  As a result, the exact federal demands of arbitration clauses rela-
tive to federal common law standards remain open for further
clarification.  Nevertheless, Berg remains a significant decision because it
illustrates that independent federal law concerns must be evaluated when
47. Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1175 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (citing Manetti-Far-
row, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 512–513 (9th Cir. 1988)); see also Scherk v. Al-
berto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974).
48. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
49. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
50. Id. at 593.
51. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 1174.
52. Id. at 1771.
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assessing the validity of arbitration agreements in the corporation-share-
holder litigation context.
PART IV: STATE LAWS
After satisfying implementation under state corporate law and federal
pronouncements about the use of arbitration, proponents of arbitration
clauses must still satisfy traditional state substantive law demands.  These
substantive law demands commonly relate to contract law because “arbi-
tration is a matter of contract”53 and because a corporation’s governance
documents are “a contract between the State and the corporation, and the
corporation and its shareholders.”54  Additionally, some states have their
own catchall provisions.  In Delaware, for example, DGCL Section
102(b)(1) contains a catchall requirement that provisions in a corpora-
tion’s articles of incorporation must “not [be] contrary to the laws of this
State.”55  Because this limit governs the articles of incorporation and be-
cause the arbitration clause will be adopted in the articles of incorporation
or in bylaws, which must stay within the scope of the articles of incorpora-
tion, any arbitration clause must not be contrary to the laws of the state
where they are adopted.  State laws contain a variety of rules that arbitra-
tion clauses may implicate, principally those concerned with mutual as-
sent, unconscionability, and retroactivity.  The following will examine how
various states apply these doctrines.
A. Mutual Assent
Under state laws generally, a valid contract requires mutual assent of
the parties, meaning agreement by both parties to a contract.  “[A] party
cannot be required to submit any dispute to arbitration that it has not
agreed to submit.”56  Rather than decide for itself when parties have
agreed to submit to arbitration, the Supreme Court defers to states on
questions such as mutual assent.  Thus, “courts generally . . . apply ordi-
nary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts” when
“deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter (includ-
ing arbitrability).”57
The Third Circuit addressed the issue of mutual assent in the context of
arbitration bylaws in Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C.58  In
Kirleis, a law firm sought to enforce a bylaw arbitration clause against a
lawyer-shareholder of the firm in a dispute that later arose between the
53. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010).
54. STAAR Surgical Co. v. Waggoner, 588 A.2d 1130, 1136 (Del. 1991) (citing Lawson
v. Household Finance Corp., 152 A. 723, 727 (Del. Supr. 1930)).
55. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1) (2014).
56. Cheek v. United Healthcare of the Mid-Atl., Inc., 835 A.2d 656, 661 (2003) (citing
Curtis G. Testerman Co. v. Buck, 667 A.2d 649, 654 (1995)).
57. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
58. Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2009).
Fall 2014] Enforceability of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses 141
lawyer and the firm.59  Three factors motivated the court to strike down
the mandatory arbitration provision for lack of mutual assent: first, and
most importantly, the lawyer was never provided a copy of the bylaws;60
second, the lawyer was never informed of the existence of the arbitration
provision in the bylaws;61 and third, the lawyer never signed any document
that referred to the arbitration provision.62  The Third Circuit did not go
so far as to require the presence of all of these elements to satisfy mutual
assent; rather, it remains possible that the existence of any or a combina-
tion of these factors would have been a sufficient basis from which a court
could find mutual assent satisfied.63  Because the lawyer never knew of the
arbitration bylaw, the court reasoned that it would have been impossible
for the lawyer to consent to the terms contained therein.64  The Kirleis
decision, however, represents an easy case.  A more difficult question
arises when the shareholder either has been given notice, or could be
deemed on constructive notice.65
Lower courts in Maryland have adopted a broad understanding of mu-
tual assent, particularly in regard to the concept of notice.  As one Mary-
land court stated, “Maryland courts as well as courts from other
jurisdictions have frequently ruled that constructive knowledge, construc-
tive notice, and knowledge/notice through incorporation-by-reference are
adequate to inform and bind a party to a contract, thereby satisfying mutu-
ality.”66  In Corvex Management LP v. Commonwealth REIT, stockhold-
ers brought suit against a real estate investment trust (REIT) whose
bylaws contained both a mandatory arbitration provision and a ban on
class actions, including shareholder derivative suits.67  The court found
59. Id. at 158–59.
60. Id. at 159, 165 (explaining that Kirleis could not have explicitly agreed to arbitrate
her claims because she never received a copy of the bylaws and was unaware of the existence
of the arbitration provision contained therein).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 159, 161–62 (“Had the Firm submitted contradictory evidence showing that
Kirleis had received the bylaws or had signed them, its argument regarding the sufficiency of
Kirleis’s affidavit would merit further discussion.”).
63. See id. at 160–61 (“Under Pennsylvania law, contract formation requires: (1) a
mutual manifestation of an intention to be bound, (2) terms sufficiently definite to be en-
forced, and (3) consideration.” (citing Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 603
(2002)). “In the employment context, arbitration agreements will be upheld when they are
‘specific enough (i.e. unambiguous) to cover the employee’s claims’ and ‘the employee has
expressly agreed to abide by the terms of [the] agreement.’” (quoting Quiles v. Fin. Exch.
Co., 879 A.2d 281, 285.)).
64. Id. at 165.
65. See Black, supra note 15, at 113–14 (“There has been considerable litigation over
assent to arbitration in cases where a document containing a purported agreement to arbi-
trate is made available (either physically or online) to an individual who then takes some
action consistent with contract performance, such as keeping the purchased goods . . . .”).
66. Corvex Mgmt. LP v. Commonwealth REIT, 2013 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 3 at *27
(Md. Cir. Ct. 2013).
67. Id. at *4, *5–6.
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mutual assent was established, holding, “[p]laintiffs purchased shares with
at least constructive knowledge that the Arbitration Bylaws were in effect
and that their shares were subject to them.”68  The shareholders were
found to have actual knowledge of the corporate bylaws because the plain-
tiffs purchased stock certificates that contained a legend informing share-
holders that by keeping stock certificates they agree to be bound by
bylaws, the arbitration bylaw itself stated that “any shareholder of the
Trust” would be bound.69  The shareholders were also deemed to have
constructive notice: “[b]ecause bylaws constitute part of a binding flexible
contract among the directors, officers, and stockholders, CWH stockhold-
ers are on notice that . . .  the board itself may act unilaterally . . . .”70
Plaintiffs were not entitled to demand affirmative written assent in regard
to the arbitration provision, the third Kirleis factor.71  Yet the court distin-
guished Corvex from the third Kirleis factor, noting, “[t]here is a differ-
ence between realizing that one is party to an agreement, yet refusing to
consent to it, and failing to comprehend that an agreement to which one is
subject to exists altogether.”72  In Kirleis the party to be bound by the
arbitration agreement never knew the arbitration agreement existed,
whereas the Corvex plaintiffs ignored the written provisions on their stock
certificates.
Corvex is not the only time that Maryland courts have addressed the
issue of notice with respect to arbitration agreements; the Circuit Court of
Maryland, Baltimore City ruled on a related matter in Katz v. Common-
Wealth REIT.73  In Katz, individual shareholders and a pension fund, who
sought to brand themselves as “ordinary shareholders,” brought a consoli-
dated class and derivative suit against alleging that the defendant breached
certain fiduciary duties.74  The Katz plaintiffs sought to distinguish them-
selves from the Corvex plaintiffs by alleging that they lacked knowledge of
the arbitration bylaws at the time they purchased their shares.75  Rejecting
this argument, the court ruled that because shareholders had constructive
68. Id. at *29.
69. Id. at *5–6, *29.
70. The Trustee Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File a Notice of Supplemental Au-
thority in Further Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Speedy Declaratory Hearing Under
Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and for Declaratory and/or Injunctive Relief
at 28–29, Del. Cnty. Employees Ret. Fund. v. Portnoy, No. 13-cv-10405-DJC (D. Mass. Feb.
20, 2014).
71. Corvex, 2013 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 3 at *26–27 (“This Court cannot demand any
higher standard of an arbitration agreement than what would be demanded of a typical con-
tract under Maryland law. . . . Maryland courts as well as courts from other jurisdictions have
frequently ruled that constructive knowledge, constructive notice, and knowledge/notice
through incorporation-by-reference are adequate to inform and bind a party to a contract.”)
72. Id. at *20.
73. Katz v. CommonWealth REIT No. 24-C-13-001299 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. City, Feb.
19, 2014).
74. Id. at *8–9.
75. Id. at *9.
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knowledge of the arbitration bylaw, the provision was also enforceable
against them.76  Thus, constructive notice is an expansive doctrine in
Maryland.
Other Circuits have made similarly attenuated findings of mutual as-
sent in the context of investor-corporation arbitration clauses.  In Sandal-
wood Debt Fund A, L.P. v. KPMG, LLP, a New Jersey court upheld the
applicability of an arbitration clause to investors when the clause was con-
tained in a hedge fund’s engagement letters with its auditor.77  The San-
dalwood plaintiffs—limited partners of feeder funds—brought suit against
the auditor, KPMG, after the funds lost substantially all of their value.
Even though the limited partners lacked input in choosing the auditor and
did not consent to the terms of engagement, the court enforced the arbi-
tration agreement against them, reasoning that because the claims were
derivative and not direct, investors had to comply with the corporation’s
contractual relationships with third parties regarding claims brought on
behalf of the corporation.78
While the above decisions concerning assent provide some guidance,
the particulars as to the permissibility of corporation-shareholder arbitra-
tion clauses remain ambiguous.  For example, does publicly filing bylaws
with the Commission constitute adequate notice?  On one hand, disclosure
is the principal mechanism by which securities laws are believed to achieve
their goals, which is why it is a defense for a variety of Securities Act and
Exchange Act claims.79  It is not immediately clear why disclosure, a
mechanism found to be reliable in other contexts, would not be sufficient
to make shareholders aware of the existence of arbitration bylaws.  Alter-
natively, opponents would suggest that mere maintenance of a stock posi-
tion and passive ownership of shares is not a sufficient indication that the
shareholders manifested assent.80  After Corvex and Katz there seems to
be more support for the former viewpoint, but shareholders in that case
had one thing that might well make a difference to subsequent courts: a
legend.
The second question concerning adequacy of notice is whether a corpo-
ration must include a legend on its securities indicating the shareholder
will agree to be bound by the bylaws.  Legends are valuable procedural
devices that serve to alert shareholders that they need to look at the by-
laws and that continued ownership will constitute assent.  But, a securities
legend is unlikely to be a necessary feature of an arbitration bylaw.  In
today’s world of electronic communication, filing with the Commission
might function in place of a legend.  Additionally, legends may not even
76. Id. at *29.
77. Sandalwood Debt Fund A, L.P. v. KPMG, LLP, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS
1624 (App. Div. July 1, 2013).
78. Id. at *21.
79. See The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Dec. 22, 2014).
80. See Black, supra note 15, at 114.
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be effective because shareholders no longer receive paper stock certifi-
cates in the mail; instead, centralized brokerage firms hold the certificates.
Thus, even if the certificate contained a legend, perhaps shareholders
would still be able to claim that they never had the opportunity to read the
provision and that they should consequently not be bound by it.  Such
claims sound similar to those made by the lawyer-plaintiff in Kirleis and
are likely to find favor by courts.81  In lieu of these challenges, the next
best solution to a paper legend may be a notice on the corporation’s
website.82
Corporations might be able to avoid mutual assent challenges by seek-
ing a different form of implementation: shareholder proxy vote.  Such a
vote would function as an affirmative act of assent, which would allow
courts to avoid having to decipher what exactly constitutes constructive
notice.  A shareholder vote implicates another question: whether non-as-
senting shareholders are bound.  Binding objectors would not raise a no-
tice problem because voting shareholders would be aware of the
provisions the corporation adopted.  By continuing to remain a share-
holder, investors would make a conscious choice and thus they would not
be entitled to claim surprise (an element of unconscionability discussed
below).  Nevertheless, one scholar asserted that “there is a serious ques-
tion of fairness about taking away rights from current shareholders who
did not assent to the provision,”83 which would likely enable shareholders
to assert that binding them to arbitration was invalid on retroactivity
grounds.  It has been suggested that corporations could alleviate the mu-
tual assent problem with dissenting shareholders by offering such share-
holders appraisal rights.84  Under Maryland and New Jersey law, offering
appraisal rights is not a necessary concession.85  Further, under the
DGCL, shareholders are allowed to make corporate governance changes
in other contexts without requiring the corporation to compensate objec-
tors.86  If appraisal rights were to be granted every time a shareholder
disagreed with a particular vote, the corporation’s ability to manage its
affairs efficiently would be greatly impaired.  Nevertheless, appraisal
81. See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text.
82. U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGA-
TION: THE PROBLEM, ITS IMPACT, AND THE PATH TO REFORM 42 (2008), available at http://
ilr.iwssites.com/uploads/sites/1/SecuritiesBooklet.pdf; See Joseph W. Bartlett, Tort Reform in
the Securities Sector, 12 J. PRIVATE EQUITY 99, 101–06 (2008) (describing recommendations
for adequate notice that both support and oppose the argument that a paper legend does not
effectively cure lack of notice).
83. Black, supra note 15, at 110.
84. Id. at 111.
85. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 3-208 (West 2014) (only referencing ap-
praisal rights in the context of shareholders receiving fair value of their shares following
transfer of those shares to a successor organization); NJ Stat Ann. § 14A:11-1 (West 2014)
(strictly limiting the situations in which a shareholder can dissent).
86. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(1) (2010) (limiting the situations in which ap-
praisal rights will be available).
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rights would be likely to help a corporation obtain court and the Commis-
sion’s approval, especially if they were inclined to follow Kirleis.
B. Unconscionability
The second state law issue implicated by arbitration clauses is uncon-
scionability.  Barbara Black asserts that “[a] class action waiver . . . may be
unenforceable because it is unconscionable under the FAA.”87  This argu-
ment rests upon a belief that “particularly small retail investors . . . claims
will not be sufficiently large to make it economically feasible to bring indi-
vidual arbitration claims.”88  Economic infeasibility is evidenced by refer-
ence to “[t]he costs of proving a federal securities fraud claim—including
falsity, materiality, efficient market, scienter, causation, and damages.”89
Under Black’s view, allowing an individual to engage in a contract that
would in effect preclude her from bringing claims against a corporation
because the financial incentives are tilted so far away from the share-
holder’s favor would be so one-sided as to be unconscionable.  This section
will assess the validity of such claims by comparing laws of states that ap-
pear to reach different conclusions on the issue.  First, this section dis-
cusses California’s strict unconscionability laws and the factors that courts
would likely apply to arbitration clauses. An analysis of California law is
favored over Delaware law because California’s elements present more
difficult hurdles for arbitration clauses;90 if a prospective arbitration clause
would withstand California scrutiny, it is likely to survive Delaware scru-
tiny.  Second, this section explores more permissive laws, such as those in
Maryland, to rebut claims of unconscionability, highlighting a modern
trend among courts that provides strong support for finding shareholder-
corporation arbitration clauses valid.
1. California
California statutory law sets forth a state preference for the existence
of an unconscionability doctrine and empowers California courts with the
discretion to decide the exact contours of the rule.91  The Supreme Court
of California has established that procedural and substantive unconsciona-
bility must both be present in order for a court to exercise its discretion to
87. Id. at 124.
88. Id. at 125.
89. Id.
90. For example, instead of shielding consumers from potential costs that would deter
suit, Delaware courts have been willing to uphold the validity of corporate bylaw provisions
that shift fees and expenses that result from intra-corporate litigation to an unsuccessful liti-
gant. See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 560 (Del. 2014) (“Legally
permissible bylaws adopted for an improper purpose are unenforceable in equity.  The intent
to deter litigation, however, is not invariably an improper purpose. Fee-shifting provisions, by
their nature, deter litigation.  Because fee-shifting provisions are not per se invalid, an intent
to deter litigation would not necessarily render the bylaw unenforceable in equity.”).
91. Cal. Civ. Code § 1670.5(a) (West 2014).
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refuse to enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of unconsciona-
bility.92 Procedural unconscionability concerns contract negotiation and
the respective circumstances of the parties at that time, aspects which are
assessed by the oppression and surprise involved in the agreement.93  Op-
pression addresses the weaker party’s absence of choice and unequal bar-
gaining power that results in “no real negotiation.”94  Surprise involves the
extent to which the contract clearly discloses its terms as well as the rea-
sonable expectations of the weaker party.95  Courts assess oppression and
surprise using a multi-factor test.  Relevant factors include whether the
agreement in question was a standardized contract, was drafted by the
party of superior bargaining strength, and whether it relegated to the sub-
scribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.96
The presence of any of those factors suggests procedural unconscionabil-
ity.  The degree of procedural unconscionability is enhanced when a con-
tract binds an individual to terms that are not provided at the time of the
agreement97 or where the non-drafting party was forced to obtain the
terms from another source.98  A contract is substantively unconscionable
when it is unjustifiably one-sided to such an extent that it “shocks the con-
science.”99  In assessing whether arbitration contracts are one-sided, the
Ninth Circuit considers, among other factors, how arbitrators are selected,
the rules and procedures of the arbitration, division of fees, and the ability
to modify agreements.100
Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co. illustrates how California courts as-
sess unconscionability factors in the context of an arbitration agreement
between a grocery store, Ralphs, and one of its employees, Chavarria.101
The arbitration agreement was presented on a “take it or leave it” basis,
Chavarria had no opportunity to negotiate its terms, and the terms were
not provided to Chavarria until three weeks after he signed the agreement;
meanwhile, Ralphs was given the practical ability to select the arbitrator,
who was required to be a retired judge, could modify the agreement at its
discretion, and required that the arbitration fees be split and paid up front
92. Pinnacle Museum Tower Ass’n v. Pinnacle Mkt. Dev. (US), LLC, 282 P.3d 1217,
1232 (2012); Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal
2000) (citing Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 145 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)). Lower
state courts have subsequently applied this rule. See, e.g., Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co.,
733 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc.,
6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000)).
93. Chavarria, 733 F.3d at 922 (citing Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690).
94. Id. (quoting A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 122 (1982)).
95. Id.; see also Parada v. Superior Ct., 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 743, 757 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
96. Chavarria, 733 F.3d at 923 (citing Pokorny v. Quixtar, Inc., 601 F.3d 987, 996 (9th
Cir. 2010)).
97. Id. (citing Pokorny, 601 F.3d at 997).
98. See Harper v. Ultimo, 113 Cal. App. 4th 1402 (Ct. App. 2003).
99. Chavarria, 733 F.3d at 923 (quoting Parada, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 1578).
100. See infra notes 97–101 and accompanying text.
101. Chavarria, 733 F.3d at 916.
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before the claim would be heard.102  The Chavarria court addressed each
of these elements in highlighting how they collectively violated California
law regarding unconscionability.  It is important to note that while the
court was critical of certain terms contained in an arbitration agreement,
California law is not unfavorable towards arbitration more generally.103
Instead, it reflects a generally applicable policy against abuses of bargain-
ing power.104
The court found the agreement both procedurally and substantively
unconscionable.105  With regard to procedure, both oppression and sur-
prise were present.106  The contract was oppressive because consent to the
agreement was a condition of applying for employment, the terms were
presented on a “take it or leave it” basis, and Chavarria lacked an oppor-
tunity to negotiate the terms.107  The agreement was a surprise because
the terms were not provided until three weeks after Chavarria agreed to
be bound by the terms.108  The court also found the agreement substan-
tively unconscionable.109  First, under the agreement, the party who did
not bring the arbitration would select the arbitrator.110  This provision was
problematic because any time the employee properly brought a complaint
to an arbitrator, the corporation would be able to make the selection as to
who decided the dispute.111  Second, the court found that requiring a re-
tired judge to conduct the arbitration as opposed to an institutional arbi-
trator, who is subject to rules and procedures that ensure neutrality, was
problematic.112  Were such a selection process permissible, a corporation
could define the procedures for arbitrator selection in an unfair manner
and avoid the oversight of an institutional arbitrator who would require
more balanced rules, thus creating a regime that leaned in its favor.113
Third, the court found that two provisions regarding fees were problem-
atic: first, that the arbitrator’s fees must be paid up front; second, that the
102. Id. at 922–23.
103. Id. at 927.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 926 (“here we have both”).
106. See id. at 922.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 926.
110. Id. at 927.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 920, n.1, 923 (highlighting the problem is not with the selection of judges
themselves, but instead the preclusion of institutional arbitration administrators, namely
AAA or JAMS, which have established rules and procedures to select a neutral arbitrator).
113. By contrast, the American Arbitration Association’s arbitrator selection rules
takes into account the preferences of both parties and the Association conducts a conflict
check before seating a panel, which prevents one party from having the ability to individually
select those who will resolve the dispute. See AAA Arbitrator Select, AM. ARBITRATION
ASS’N 2, https://www.adr.org/cs/idcplg?IdcService=GET_FILE&dDocName=ADRSTG_016
003&RevisionSelectionMethod=LatestReleased (last visited Dec. 22, 2014).
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arbitrator had to divide these costs equally, disregarding any state provi-
sions regarding cost-shifting.114  Fourth, this agreement could be modified
at the sole discretion of Ralphs, which ran afoul of prior precedent that
found unilateral modification provisions to be substantively
unconscionable.115
Using the Ninth Circuit jurisprudence outlined above, one can predict
whether shareholder arbitration agreements as a whole would be permissi-
ble, even without having a particular shareholder arbitration agreement at
issue.  First, with regard to procedural unconscionability, most shareholder
suits would not pass the oppression test because individual investors rarely
have the ability to negotiate terms with the corporation.  Instead, they
purchase shares over online trading platforms or through brokers.  In ei-
ther situation they do not have the ability to conduct negotiations directly
with the issuer about the terms under which stock is purchased.  Perhaps it
would be possible that institutional investors who have access to the is-
suer’s executives would be able to negotiate terms through a private place-
ment, but such an occurrence would differ factually from the prototypical
shareholder litigation predicated upon exchange-based transactions.  An
argument could be made that all investors—individuals, controllers, and
institutions—can negotiate different terms through a proxy solicitation
and vote.  Such an argument is open for dispute.  On one hand, mere pres-
ence in a meeting, as in Chavarria, was found insufficient to constitute a
“real” opportunity for negotiation.116  On the other hand, Chavarria was
required to consent to the terms as a condition of filing an application for
employment,117 suggesting a potential way to distinguish existing and pro-
spective shareholders: existing shareholders have an ability to negotiate
implementation of new terms at an annual meeting whereas prospective
shareholders may only enter into a securities contract on a “take it or
leave it” basis.
Satisfaction of the second aspect of procedural unconscionability, sur-
prise, depends upon how the bylaw is proposed.  If the board enacts an
arbitration clause through a unilateral change of corporation bylaws, then
the terms would clearly come as a surprise to shareholders.  If, however,
the terms were passed through a corporate election, then shareholders
would have notice of the terms.  Claims brought by shareholders who pur-
chased shares of a public corporation on the secondary market after the
arbitration clause was enacted would have the weakest claims of surprise
because they may be deemed to be on constructive notice.  A public cor-
114. Chavarria, 733 F.3d at 925.
115. Id. at 926 (citing Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1179 (9th Cir.
2003)).
116. Id. at 922.
117. Id. at 919 (“By completing an employment application with Ralphs, all potential
employees agree to be bound by Ralphs’ arbitration policy.  The application contains an ac-
knowledgment that the terms of the mandatory and binding arbitration policy have been
provided for the applicant’s review.”).
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poration’s bylaws are filed with the Commission and could be accessed by
the general public via EDGAR online.118  Because anybody could find out
what the terms of the stock purchase were by looking at the stock certifi-
cate or by going to the Commission website, prospective shareholders
would have difficulty alleging that their “reasonable expectations” were
disappointed.119  It should be noted, however, that under the Harper gui-
dance, the “reasonable expectations” of surprise interact with the element
of oppression, an element which is established when a contracting party
must to go to another source to find the terms of the agreement—the very
thing that happens when shareholders must access the Commission filings
in addition to their online trading system.120  Furthermore, under Po-
korny, this requirement to find information externally is especially prob-
lematic when the agreement is presented on a “take-it-or-leave-it”
basis.121  Accordingly, new and existing shareholders of corporations
whose boards act unilaterally are able to satisfy both elements of procedu-
ral unconscionability, while shareholders who vote have weaker claims.
Analysis of substantive unconscionability is more complicated because
California uses a multi-factor test and the court in Chavarria did not artic-
ulate exactly how many factors would need to be present.  Nevertheless, it
is likely that establishing as few as one of the relevant factors would be
enough because the Chavarria court stated that the terms in question in
that case “lie far beyond the line required to render an agreement inva-
lid.”122  The first and second Chavarria factors are likely to be easily
avoided by corporations.123  By simply stating that the arbitration would
be conducted by and under the procedures of a respected arbitral institu-
tion, such as the American Arbitration Association (AAA), the corpora-
tion would ensure that the arbitrator selection process was fair and in
compliance with standard practice.  Using the AAA’s terms satisfies di-
rectly the second objection (mandating a retired judge conduct arbitra-
tion) and indirectly the first (unilateral control of selection).  Notably, the
AAA uses a process whereby both parties rank out their preferences for
arbitrators after striking those who would be unsatisfactory, with those
118. 17 C.F.R. § 229.601 (2012) (see exhibit 3 on the exhibit table).
119. Harper v. Ultimo, 113 Cal. App. 4th 1402, 1406 (Ct. App. 2003).
120. Id. (“Here is the oppression: . . . The customer is forced to go to another source to
find out the full import of what he or she is about to sign – and must go to that effort prior to
signing.”).
121. Pokorny v. Quixtar, Inc., 601 F.3d 987, 996–97 (9th Cir. 2010).
122. Chavarria, 733 F.3d at 926.
123. See, e.g., DONALD M. VUCHETICH AND SUSAN G. VUCHETICH, GANNETT CO., INC.
SHAREHOLDER ARBITRATION PROPOSAL (2011) available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/
corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2012/2donaldvuchetich022212-14a8.pdf  (“[A]ny controversy or
claim . . . shall be settled . . . in accordance with the commercial arbitration rules of the
American Arbitration Association . . . .”).
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whose total score is collectively most satisfactory conducting the
arbitration.124
The third aspect of substantive unconscionability presents a murkier
challenge.  In Chavarria, the court was troubled by the agreement’s re-
quirement that the arbitrator must, at the outset of the proceedings, ap-
portion the arbitrator’s fees between Ralphs and Chavarria regardless of
the merits of the claim.  Ralphs argued that the provision was not prob-
lematic because it complies with the “American Rule,” articulated by the
AAA, that each party shall bear its own fees and costs.125  The Ninth Cir-
cuit demurred, identifying this provision as “a model of how employers
can draft fee provisions to price almost any employee out of the dispute
resolution process.”126  In reaching this decision, the court differentiated
allocation of arbitrator fees from attorney fees, finding apportionment of
the former impermissible, while finding AAA-based provisions governing
the latter acceptable.127  The Supreme Court stated that filing and admin-
istrative fees attached to arbitration that are so high as to make access to a
forum impracticable may render an agreement unenforceable.128
Whether or not apportionment of arbitration fees is permissible de-
pends upon how assuredly a cost would be incurred.  Ironically, if a corpo-
ration specifies a given forum, the provision is more likely to be found
impermissible than if the corporation drafted a vague, open-ended term.
For example, in Kilgore v. KeyBank National Ass’n, plaintiffs asserted that
students would not be able to afford arbitration fees as a basis for arguing
unconscionability.129  The Ninth Circuit rejected Kilgore’s claims, relying
on Supreme Court guidance in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v.
Randolph, which held that “the ‘risk’ that a [plaintiff] will be saddled with
prohibitive costs is too speculative to justify the invalidation of an arbitra-
tion agreement.”130  While Green Tree recognized that “[i]t may well be
that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant . . .
from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral fo-
rum,” the “record reveal[ed] only the arbitration agreement’s silence on
the subject.”131  Silence alone, without proof of actual costs, is “plainly
124. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, MODEL RULES FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 15
(2013), available at https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTG_004103
&revision=latestreleased (see R-12. Appointment from National Roster for exact
procedures).
125. Chavarria, 733 F.3d at 925.
126. Id. at 923.
127. Id. at 923, 925 (“The troubling aspect of the cost allocation provision relates to the
arbitrator fees, not attorney fees.”).
128. Am. Express Corp. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.Ct. 2304, 2310–11 (2013) [herein-
after Italian Colors].
129. Kilgore v. KeyBank Nat’l Ass’n, 718 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2013).
130. Id. at 1058 (alteration in original) (quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Ran-
dolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90-91 (2000)).
131. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala., 531 U.S. at 90–91.
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insufficient to render it unenforceable.”132  The Supreme Court deemed
the record insufficient because the plaintiff had only assumed the AAA
would conduct arbitration, that standard AAA fees would apply, and that
the fees would not be waived in her specific situation.133  Thus, the agree-
ment’s silence on arbitration prevented the plaintiff from the opportunity
to adequately plead that arbitration under the given procedures precluded
him from the chance to effectively vindicate his rights.  Consequently, an
arbitration clause that planned to split fees would be best written
ambiguously.
Another distinction bears on the question of arbitration fees.  The
court in Italian Colors stated “the fact that it is not worth the expense
involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination
of the right to pursue that remedy.”134  This declaration is not inconsistent
with Green Tree.  Significantly, Italian Colors speculated that the Green
Tree argument about effective vindication of rights “would perhaps cover
filing and administrative fees attached to arbitration that are so high as to
make access to the forum impracticable.”135  These cases indicate that the
Court is concerned about high ex-ante costs as a predicate to access a deci-
sion-making body, not with internal decisions about how to litigate.  Thus,
a plaintiff’s high attorneys’ fees, high expert costs, or inability to dedicate
the time necessary to pursue resolution of the dispute are factors that af-
fect the choice a plaintiff makes.  In contrast, where access to the courts—
which are subsidized by taxpayers—has been precluded by an arbitration
clause and the access to the arbitral tribunal is exceedingly costly, concerns
arise that the plaintiff has lost the ability to access justice.  The Chavarria
court relied upon this very distinction in finding that the arbitration agree-
ment’s imposition of high fees, amounting to $3,500 to $7,000 for each day
of the arbitration just to pay for her share of the arbitrator’s fee was sub-
stantively unconscionable as a pre-condition to having a dispute heard.136
Interestingly, the Chavarria court did not evaluate unconscionability in the
abstract, but rather in light of the likely amount of the plaintiff’s expected
recovery, current occupation, and income.137  Moreover, the court noted
that the agreement fixed fee allocation on an equal basis, thus disregarding
any default state laws that would reallocate filing fees.138
132. Id. at 81.
133. Id. at 91 n.6 (“She stated that ‘[f]or the purposes of this discussion, we will assume
filing with the [American Arbitration Association], the filing fee is $500 for claims under
$10,000 and this does not include the cost of the arbitrator or administrative fees.’ . . . None
of this information affords a sufficient basis for concluding that Randolph would in fact have
incurred substantial costs in the event her claim went to arbitration.”).
134. Italian Colors, 133 U.S. at 2311.
135. Id. at 2310–11.
136. Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 925 (9th Cir. 2013).
137. Id. at 925 n.5.
138. Id. at 925.
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As a result of the Green Tree and Kilgore decisions, corporations may
attempt to avoid specifying arbitral tribunals in order to avoid claims of
substantive unconscionability.  Of course, doing so may raise the procedu-
ral unconscionability concerns articulated above regarding selection of an
arbitral tribunal.  Moreover, excluding a forum name may not even be
enough to save them—the Chavarria court reached its conclusion about
costs without reference to any binding agreement, perhaps in violation of
Green Tree’s mandate against speculative costs.  One interpretation is that
the assessment of costs, which paralleled the AAA’s standard fees, follows
from the court’s prior ruling that the AAA should be used to satisfy the
tests of procedural unconscionability.  This culmination of factors would
represent a worst-case scenario for corporations considering arbitration
clauses: first, they must specify the AAA; and second, they cannot make
plaintiff pay the AAA’s high fees as a predicate for accessing the tribunal.
Consequently, corporations would have to either pay the $7,000 to $14,000
filing fees ex-ante or they would have to keep using the current system of
shareholder class-action litigation.
Even under the rigors of California’s substantive unconscionability
rules, corporations may still find a way to enforce mandatory arbitration
agreements in shareholder litigation.  First, it is possible the AAA would
waive a plaintiff’s up-front fees.  To assess mandatory arbitration agree-
ments in shareholder suits one would need to know how often plaintiff’s
fees were waived and in each individual case before the court whether or
not the arbitral body had agreed to waive the particular plaintiff’s fees.
Second, because Chavarria used an individualized test, arbitration agree-
ments may be enforceable for certain investors but not others.  To assess
this aspect one would need to determine (1) the amount of the individual
claim and (2) the financial liquidity of a given investor.  As to the first test,
more money at stake would suggest a lower probability of substantive un-
conscionability.  Thus, an investor alleging a loss of $100,000 may be
forced to front $3,500 to have the claim be arbitrated, while a passive in-
vestor alleging a loss of $50 may not have to abide by the arbitration
agreement.  As for the second aspect, possession of more money suggests
a greater ability to pay for up-front costs and, in turn, a lesser probability
of being unable to access the dispute resolution system.  Consequently, a
billionaire may be forced to pay the filing fee and arbitrate his claims,
whereas Chavarria, the Ralphs grocer, may not have to arbitrate his
claims.  Third, corporations should not articulate how fees will be split be-
tween the parties, or, at a minimum, should allow state laws governing fee
allocation of particular categories of disputes to remain in force.  A finding
of unconscionability is less likely when the arbitration agreement allocates
costs in a manner condoned by the legislative body that had the power to
make such decisions.
In conclusion, arbitration agreements are likely to be procedurally un-
conscionable because they are oppressive when not negotiated and sur-
prise shareholders when not voted upon by the shareholders to be bound.
Agreements risk being found substantively unconscionable to the extent
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that the predicate fees to access a tribunal outweigh an investor’s possible
recovery.  Consequently, under California law, investor-litigation arbitra-
tion clauses may only be able to bind certain, well-capitalized, voting
shareholders, forcing the corporation to engage in multiple dispute resolu-
tion forums—the courts for those who cannot be bound and arbitration
tribunals for those who can.  Such an outcome undermines two principal
benefits of arbitration: low cost and procedurally streamlined resolution of
disputes.
2. Maryland
Maryland courts require similar elements as those in California regard-
ing unconscionability.  Even so, the way in which Maryland courts apply
those elements permits substantially more arbitration agreements to re-
main valid than if California courts reviewed those same arbitration
clauses.  In Maryland, “[a]n unconscionable bargain or contract has been
defined as one characterized by extreme unfairness, which is made evident
by (1) one party’s lack of meaningful choice, and (2) contractual terms
that unreasonably favor the other party.”139  The court must consider
whether the terms “are so one-sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an
innocent party or whether there exists an egregious imbalance in the obli-
gations and rights imposed by the arbitration clause.”140  Applying these
rules, in Cheek v. United Healthcare of the Mid-Atlantic, Inc., the high
court of Maryland found an arbitration provision illusory and thus unen-
forceable where it could be revoked at any time by the employer, even
after the arbitration was initiated, and without notice to the other party
because such terms unreasonably favor one party over the other.141  Simi-
larly, in the recent case, Noohi v. Tool Brothers, Inc., the Fourth Circuit
applied Maryland law in its decision to overturn an arbitration clause that
waived the buyer’s right to litigate, but not the seller’s right, because such
terms unreasonably favor one party.142
In contrast, the Federal District Court for the District of Massachusetts
applied Maryland law to reach a contrary view about the first aspect of
unconscionability—meaningful choice—in Portnoy.143 Portnoy was a
challenge related to the aforementioned Corvex decision in which the
plaintiffs alleged that they had no notice whatsoever (actual, constructive
or otherwise) because nearly every plaintiff purchased stock before the
arbitration clause was inserted into the bylaws.144  Plaintiffs supported
their assertion by alleging that they could not read the stock certificates
139. Del. Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund v. Portnoy, No. 13-10405-DJC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
40107, at *44 (D. Mass. Mar. 26, 2014) (citing Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 872 A.2d 735, 743
(Md. 2005)).
140. Walther, 872 A.2d at 747.
141. Cheek v. United Healthcare of the Mid-Atl., Inc., 835 A.2d 656 (Md. 2003).
142. Noohi v. Tool Bros., Inc., 708 F.3d 599, 602, 610 (4th Cir. 2013).
143. Portnoy, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40107.
144. Id. at *33, *35.
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because such certificates are typically represented by only one or more
immobilized jumbo stock certificates that they did not hold.145  In dis-
missing the overall claim about notice, the court clarified the Maryland
rule, stating, “Maryland law suggests that a party to a contract is presumed
to have knowledge of company bylaws incorporated into the contract,
even if they are not provided with a copy of them.”146  While notice is
typically considered an issue pertaining to mutual consent, it also has rele-
vance in unconscionability analysis because if a person does not have no-
tice of a term, then they are unable to make a meaningful choice.  The
court ultimately dismissed claims of unconscionability because plaintiffs
failed to establish both of the requisite elements: first, constructive notice
impliedly rebutted claims of a lack of meaningful choice; and second,
plaintiffs’ ability to vindicate their rights through arbitration rebutted
claims that the contractual terms unreasonably favored one side.147  The
effect of this decision is to make it virtually impossible for shareholders of
Maryland corporations to win unconscionability claims.
C. Retroactivity
Many states prohibit subsequent contract modifications from binding
parties.  This Note refers to such problems as retroactivity, which can also
be understood in terms of fair notice.  Prohibition of the retroactive effect
of contract changes is analogous to the prohibition of ex post facto laws,
which change the legal consequences or status of actions that were com-
mitted, or relationships that existed, before the enactment of the law.  Just
as the Constitution prohibits ex post facto legislation for criminal acts,148
so too states seek to prohibit similar behavior in the context of contractual
relationships.
Delaware has at least two relevant statutory provisions that would pro-
hibit retroactivity in a shareholder-corporation dispute.  The first concerns
regulation of restricted shares, which contain a legend disclaiming that the
shares cannot be transferred unless certain conditions are met.  Section
202(b) of the DGCL prohibits these disclaimers from binding securities
issued prior to the adoption of the restriction “unless the holders of the
securities are parties to an agreement or voted in favor of the restric-
tion.”149  The second statutory rule is more directly on point.  While Sec-
tion 102(b)(7) allows a corporation to limit the personal liability of a
director to the corporation, it cabins the corporation’s ability to limit lia-
bility, stating “[n]o such provision shall eliminate or limit the liability of a
director for any act or omission occurring prior to the date when such
145. Id. at *33.
146. Id. at *33–34.
147. Id. at *44.
148. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3.
149. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202(b) (2014).
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provision becomes effective.”150  Because of this term, a corporation could
not seek to implement an arbitration provision governing a breach of cor-
porate law after the conduct giving rise to the dispute or the dispute itself
had taken place.  Any adopted terms would only be able to modify the
rights of stockholders for events that occur after the date of adoption.  The
particular language of Section 102(b)(7) indicates the legislators were con-
cerned with providing adequate notice to shareholders.  The rationale be-
hind both 202(b) and 102(b)(7) is that drafters wanted to prevent
corporations from impairing the value of shares after those shares had
been priced and purchased with certain imbedded assumptions.  Even
though the DGCL does not contain any terms that expressly address ret-
roactivity concerns in the context of arbitration clauses, the clauses may be
viewed as impairing shareholders’ rights by changing procedure through
which shareholders prosecute their rights, and thus similar protection
should be implied.
Despite Delaware’s statutory protections, contrary precedent exists in
other states.  For example, the Georgia Court of Appeals decision in Rush-
ing v. Gold Kist, Inc., provided an expansive form of assent that went be-
yond the standard adopted by Maryland Circuit Court in Corvex.151  The
Rushing court deemed enforceable an arbitration clause added to bylaws
after a member of an agricultural cooperative originally signed his mem-
bership agreement.152  The court did not find a retroactivity problem be-
cause member had expressly agreed to be subject to existing bylaws and
bylaws “hereafter in effect.”153  Consequently, cooperative members
could be bound by terms adopted after they signed their contract because
the original authorization was deemed to have included subsequently en-
acted provisions.  Similarly, in Portnoy, the District Court of Massachu-
setts, applying Maryland law, offered a judiciability rationale, stating “the
timing of a shareholder’s stock purchase is a meaningless distinction in this
context and will lead to inconsistent and contradictory rights and remedies
for shareholders of the same company.”154
It is clear that Delaware statutes conceptualize the retroactivity prob-
lem in a different fashion than the way in which Georgia and Maryland
courts do.  But, concerns of confusion and widely divergent requirements
from state to state are mitigated for one principal reason—location of ac-
tors.  The internal affairs doctrine requires courts resolving disputes about
the adoption of or interpretation of charter and bylaw amendments to ap-
ply the law of the state of incorporation.155  Delaware corporations will be
subject to Delaware law and Georgia agricultural cooperatives will be sub-
150. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2014).
151. Rushing v. Gold Kist, Inc., 567 S.E.2d 384, 387–88 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
152. Id. at 385–86.
153. Id. at 388.
154. Del. Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund v. Portnoy, No. 13-10405-DJC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
40107, at *36 (D. Mass. Mar. 26, 2014).
155. Weitzel, supra note 2, at 109.
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ject to Georgia law.  More corporations are incorporated in Delaware than
any other state.156  Consequently, shareholders should not have reason to
fear such adverse rulings concerning assent, particularly retroactive assent.
Nevertheless, recent dicta from the Delaware Supreme Court eroded
the statutory foundation upon which shareholders would otherwise rely.
In ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, the Delaware Supreme
Court upheld the validity of a fee-shifting term that was included in the
company’s bylaws.157  At the end of an opinion that highlighted the two
tests for the legality of bylaw provisions—whether the language was
facially valid or invalid, and whether or not the provision was enacted for a
permissible purpose—the court turned to its attention to when bylaw
amendments could be enacted.  The court reasoned that because the ATP
Tour had included a clause in its certification of incorporation which speci-
fied that bylaws “may be adopted and/or amended from time to time,” and
because the ATP Tour conferred upon directors the power to enact and
amend bylaws, that it was permissible for the directors to exercise their
right to draft rules at a later date.158  In a comment that implicitly adopted
the notion that ATP members had given carte blanche consent to all sub-
sequent changes, the court simply stated “[i]f directors are so authorized,
‘stockholders will be bound by bylaws adopted unilaterally by their
boards.’”159
In part, the rationale behind the ATP court’s decision can be under-
stood when united with Delaware courts’ generally deferential view of by-
laws, expressed, principally, through a presumption of validity.160
Nevertheless, these deferential remarks are commonly supplemented by
qualifying language that confirms that the presumption is rebuttable.161  In
particular, courts have stated two reservations to the presumption: (1) a
bylaw that is inconsistent with any statute or rule of common law is
void;162 and (2) bylaws must be reasonably applied.163
While the ATP opinion would appear to have far-reaching conse-
quences for future investor litigation, it is factually distinguishable from
156. See LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 1 (2007),
available at  http://corp.delaware.gov/whycorporations_web.pdf; About Agency, DEL. DEP’T
OF STATE DIV. OF CORP., http://www.corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last visited Dec.
22, 2014).
157. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund (ATP), 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014).
158. Id. at 560 (citing Certification of Questions of Law from the United States District
Court for the District of Delaware, 2013 at 9).
159. Id.
160. See id. at 557 (quoting Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus. (Frantz), 501 A.2d 401, 407
(Del. 1985) (bylaws of a corporation are “presumed to be valid, and the courts will construe
the bylaws in a manner consistent with the law rather than strike down the bylaws.”).
161. See, e.g., Frantz, 501 A.2d at 407.
162. Id. (citing 8 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 4184 (rev. perm. ed. 1982)).
163. Id. (quoting Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. Supr. 1971) and
State v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co., 77 A. 16 (Del. Supr. 1910)).
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the prototypical stock-drop case.  The usual investor suit is brought against
a public corporation; ATP, by contrast, was a non-stock corporation.
Thus, although ATP might be read to apply to all Delaware corporations,
this is the first—and, so far, the only—case to permit, let alone address,
the retroactive application of bylaws against dissenting shareholders.164  It
remains to be seen whether Delaware courts will continue along this path,
but when considered in conjunction with the court’s clear proclamation
that an intent to deter litigation will not result in a fee-shifting bylaw pro-
vision being declared unenforceable, the scales seem to tilt against pro-
spective plaintiff shareholders.
D. Securities and Exchange Commission Rules
Assuming that an arbitration provision would satisfy all state law re-
quirements regarding confirmation and enforceability of contracts, public
corporations would still have to meet the demands of the Commission in
order to enact mandatory arbitration agreements or a corporation cannot
go through with its public offering.  The Commission plays in integral role
in regulating public offerings, namely in accelerating the effectiveness of a
corporation’s registration statement.  Recent attempts to implement arbi-
tration provisions have faced significant headwinds from the Commission.
Although the Commission has not issued formal opinions or decisions
prohibiting arbitration bylaws, it has still been able to exert pressure in
guiding corporations away from including the terms.  For example, the
Carlyle Group, LP included an arbitration provision in its preparatory S-1
filing for an IPO, but it withdrew the provision “in response to pressure
from shareholder rights activists, potential investors and the SEC.”165
Carlyle’s attempt sought to include a clause in its partnership agreement
that mandated all limited partners to submit any claims to binding
arbitration.166
Such a clause should have presented less of a cause for concern within
the Commission as compared with the agency’s likely response to share-
holder-based arbitration clauses.167  Indeed, limited partners typically pos-
sess a closer relationship to corporate managers and the general partner of
the partnership than passive shareholders possess to the managers of pub-
lic corporations.  Partnerships, even those which offer partnership inter-
164. Joseph L. Christensen, Delaware Supreme Court Finds Fee-Shifting Bylaws Permis-
sible, PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP (May 9, 2014), http://www
.paulweiss.com/media/2495878/9may14alert.pdf.
165. See Karan Singh Tyagi & Gide Loyrette Nouel, Carlyle Leaves Out Mandatory
Arbitration Clause in IPO, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Feb. 7, 2012), http://kluwerarbitra
tionblog.com/blog/2012/02/07/carlyle-leaves-out-mandatory-arbitration-clause-in-ipo/.
166. Kevin M. LaCroix, Can Investors Be Required to Arbitrate Their Claims?, THE
D&O DIARY (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.dandodiary.com/2012/01/articles/securities-litiga
tion/can-investors-be-required-to-arbitrate-their-claims/.
167. See Can Companies Force Arbitration on Shareholders?, SLINDE NELSON STAN-
FORD, http://www.duvalbusinesslaw.com/Articles/Can-Companies-Force-Arbitration-on-
Shareholders.shtml (last visited Oct. 26, 2014) [hereinafter Force Arbitration].
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ests publicly, also tend to have a fewer number of limited partners than
most public corporations have shareholders.  Moreover, limited partner-
ship agreements often provide more opportunities for collective action by
limited partners, such as leaving open the periods during which limited
partners can meet to vote on any of possible rights; by contrast, in a corpo-
rate context, shareholders generally can only vote in advance of an annual
meeting or for certain statutorily codified corporate events.168  Neverthe-
less, despite the several reasons why the government may choose a more
deferential posture for limited partnership control issues, the Commission
still chose to intervene.  Consequently, the outlook for Commission ab-
stention in a corporate shareholder context appears bleak.  This outlook
and the Commission’s resistance to the adoption of mandatory arbitration
bylaws have been further bolstered by some corporation’s boards who
have asked the Commission to support exclusion of arbitration
proposals.169
The Commission opposes mandatory arbitration agreements that pro-
hibit class-action suits because it believes that such agreements are con-
trary to the public policy interests underlying federal securities laws and
would cause a corporation to violate Section 29(a) of the Exchange Act.170
Section 29(a) relates to waiver provisions and states “[a]ny condition, stip-
ulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any
provision of this chapter or any rule of regulation thereunder, or of any
rule of a self-regulatory organization, shall be void.”171  Mr. Riesenberg,
then an Assistant General Counsel of the Commission, believed that
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration of shareholder claims would be incon-
sistent with investor protection because “it would be contrary to the public
interest to require investors . . .  to waive access to a judicial forum . . .
where such a waiver is made through a corporate charter rather than
through an individual investor’s decision.”172  This logic may very well
have been pivotal in the Commission’s resistance to Carlyle when consid-
ered in conjunction with the nature of the desired provision.  Carlyle
168. Compare Del. Code Ann. Tit. 6, § 15-401 (2014) (providing in subsection (f) that
“[e]ach partner has equal rights in the management and conduct of the partnership business
and affairs” and in subsection (j) that “[a] difference arising as to a matter in the ordinary
course of business of a partnership may be decided by a majority of the partners.  An act
outside the ordinary course of business of a partnership may be undertaken only with the
consent of all of the partners.”), with Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, § 211 (2014) (allowing the board,
not shareholders, to determine when to hold meetings pursuant to each corporation’s
bylaws).
169. See, e.g., Vold, supra note 9, at 2; see also Investor Group Asks SEC to Stand Firm
Against Forced Arbitration Corporate Bylaws, BNA, Sec. L. Daily, Dec. 13, 2103, at *1.
170. See Black, supra note 15, at 108 (The Commission “has never repudiated its staff
position that an arbitration provision in a publicly traded issuer’s governance documents
would violate the anti-waiver provisions.”); Tyagi & Nouel, supra note 165; Vold, supra note
9, at 2.
171. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (2012).
172. Thomas L. Riesenberg, Arbitration and Corporate Governance: A Reply to Carl
Schneider, INSIGHTS (Aug. 1990).
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wanted every limited partner to irrevocably agree that “any claims, suits,
actions or proceedings arising out of or relating in any way to the partner-
ship agreement or any interest in the partnership . . . shall be finally settled
arbitration,” and that each limited partner irrevocably waive any objection
he or she may have to arbitration.173  Insofar as the clause was contained
in an investment contract, which include limited partnership agreements,
these provisions would fall within Mr. Riesenberg’s proscribed categories.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
(“Dodd-Frank”) Act provides further support for the SECs restrictive pos-
ture.174  In particular, the Dodd-Frank Act permits the Commission to
“prohibit, or impose condition or limitation on the use of, agreements that
require customers or clients of any broker, dealer, or municipal securities
dealer to arbitrate any future dispute.”175  It would not be unreasonable
for the Commission to use this statutory language as an invitation to con-
tinue to oppose mandatory arbitration clauses.  Indeed, if the Commission
followed a popular canon of interpretation that specific provisions pertain-
ing to a particular issue apply instead of provisions more generally cover-
ing the issue, it might choose to use the more specific Dodd-Frank Act
commentary about arbitration in the context of securities over generally
applicable arbitration statutes.176
Arbitration bylaw opponents would encourage the Commission to take
a more restrictive perspective than Mr. Riesenberg’s. Opponents would
allege that all bylaw amendments requiring individual arbitration violate
the anti-waiver rule because such bylaws substantially weaken securities
investors’ ability to pursue substantive Exchange Act rights, namely the
private rights of action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.177  Opponents
relying on a Section 29 argument thus base their claim on in-effect rather
than procedural rights: what, in light of practical circumstances, a rational
shareholder would do.  They would allege that because a rational share-
holder without a substantial claim would not pursue a federal securities
claim in arbitration, there is no remedy, and as a thus, a waiver of investor
protections in violation of Section 29.  The Commission has not formally
addressed Mr. Riesenberg’s theories or the arguments made by arbitration
opponents, but it has granted No Action Letters after these claims were
sent to the Commission, noting that there is “some basis for [the] view that
173. See LaCroix, supra note 166.
174. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-203 (2010).
175. Force Arbitration, supra note 167.
176. Judge Russell E. Carparelli, The Rehnquist Court’s Canons of Statutory Construc-
tion, (Sept. 2005), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/lsss/2013PDS/Rehnquist_Court_Canons_ci
tations.pdf (citing two Supreme Court cases which use this canon: Green v. Bock Laundry
Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 524–26 (1989) and Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482
U.S. 437, 444–45 (1987)).
177. E.g., Vold, supra note 9, at 3.
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implementation of [such] proposal[s] would cause the company to violate
the federal securities laws.”178
Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon could be read to support
opponents’ claims because it states that an agreement or provision that
“weaken[s a party’s] ability to recover under the [Exchange] Act” is
grounds for voiding the agreement under § 29(a).179  But McMahon likely
cuts the other way.  In McMahon, the U.S. Supreme Court “limited the
scope of Section 29(a) to prohibit only waivers of the substantive obliga-
tions imposed by the Exchange Act.”180 McMahon held that “where the
SEC has sufficient statutory authority to ensure that arbitration is ade-
quate to vindicate Exchange Act rights, enforcement of an agreement to
arbitrate does not affect a waiver of compliance with any provision of the
Exchange Act under Section 29(a).”181  The Court reasoned that because
the Commission has the authority to control Self-Regulating Organiza-
tions (SROs), which adopted the mandatory arbitration clauses for dis-
putes involving brokers, the Commission has de facto ability to ensure the
arbitration provisions are adequate to vindicate Exchange Act rights.182
Because the Commission did not object to the agreements adopted by the
SROs, the agreements did not waive a substantive obligation of the Ex-
change Act.  Investor-corporation litigation should not lead to a different
result.  The Commission has the ability to exercise its authority over arbi-
tration provisions through a Release, but it has chosen not to do so with
respect to arbitration clauses, just as it was silent with the arbitration
clause in McMahon.  Moreover, opponents’ arguments about substantive
or in-effect rights violate the explicit commands of the Green Tree and
Italian Colors decisions discussed supra.  The more recent Italian Colors
decision overrules any precedent of older, attenuated cases.  Thus,
whatever basis the Commission believed suggested that arbitration provi-
sions violate federal laws has been undermined by recent Supreme Court
decisions.
CONCLUSION
The permissibility of arbitration clauses in shareholder-corporation dis-
pute resolution is a developing but currently resolved field of law.  The
FAA and the Supreme Court cases upholding its effect suggest an expan-
sive use of arbitration clauses remains possible.  When corporations make
public offerings, they engage in interstate commerce, thus making it possi-
ble for them to use the FAA.  State law issues present a greater challenge
for corporations, who must assess issues of mutual assent, unconscionabil-
178. Gannett Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 6859124 (Feb. 22, 2012); Pfizer
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 587597 (Feb. 22, 2012).
179. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 428 U.S. 220, 230 (1987) (citing
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 432 (1953)).
180. Vold, supra note 9, at 3 (citing McMahon, 428 U.S. at 228).
181. Id. at 3–4 (citing McMahon, 428 U.S. at 238) (internal quotation marks omitted).
182. McMahon, 428 U.S. at 234.
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ity, and retroactivity.  While California and the Ninth Circuit have strin-
gent understandings of unconscionability, other states such as Maryland,
Massachusetts, and Georgia have more lenient standards for mutual assent
and unconscionability.  Delaware statutes evidence a desire to prohibit
retroactive changes affecting shareholder rights, but recent cases have
pushed against such interpretations.  Consequently, corporations should
adopt the arbitration clauses in their articles of incorporation prior to do-
ing a public offering or should seek a shareholder proxy vote as the means
by which to implement the arbitration clause.
The Commission has exerted pressure to oppose mandatory arbitration
clauses in certain settings, such as with respect to the Carlyle Group’s IPO.
Nevertheless, the Commission has not taken administrative enforcement
actions against corporations that have the provisions.  Final resolution on
this issue will require a challenge in court or with the Commission.  A
corporation should be successful in challenging the Commission should it
wish to do so, finding adequate basis in Supreme Court precedent and
state law jurisprudence, particularly from Maryland’s Corvex and New
Jersey’s Sandalwood decisions.  A challenge against the Commission
would most likely arise as a corporation contemplated its IPO.  But it
would be more difficult for such a corporation to make the necessary chal-
lenge due to the antecedent costs associated with litigation.  Moreover,
established corporations will not desire risk the legal and reputational
costs associated with being first if doing so will result in Commission sanc-
tions.  Until a corporation chooses to invest the financial resources in such
a challenge, this question will remain open.
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